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Security
Transfers by Fiduciaries
The Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary
Security Transfers, promulgated at the 1958 meet-
ing of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, eliminates many of the
present "documentary" requisites of transfers re-
quired by transfer agents to assure their safety.
Professor Braucher analyzes the practical effect
of these changes on the liability of transfer agents
for participation in a breach of fiduciary duty.
Robert Braucher*
AT ITS 1958 annual meeting the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws completed work on a Uni-
form Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers. The
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association promptly ap-
proved the act, and it has been promulgated for enactment by state
legislatures convening in 1959. The act gives promise of a solution
to a problem which has long plagued attorneys for trusts and estates,
and which has produced a good deal of recent literature.'
I. TaE PROBLEM
The trouble began with a decision rendered by Mr. Chief Justice
Taney on circuit in 1848.2 Under earlier English and American de-
*Professor of Law, Harvard University; Chairman, Committee on Uniform Act
for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.
1. Extensive discussion: Christy, Responsibilities in the Transfer of Stock, 53
Micm L. REv. 701 (1955); Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries Stock Transfers,
56 MicEL. L. RE,. 848 (1958); Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 Rom-v
MT. L. REV. 88 (1957).
Summary discussion: Christy, Why Fiduciaries Should Support Model Securities
Transfer Act, 97 TRusTs & EsTATE-s 205 (1958); Christy, The Model Fidudtares
Securities Transfer Act, 29 N.Y. ST. BAR BuL. 484 (1957); David, Decedents
Securities and Their Transfer, 1 PR&c. LAw. 50 (1955); joUs, Illinois Adopts New
Statute on Security Transfer Simplification, 96 Tnusts & EsAr-Es 641 (1957); Marks,
Easing Security Transfers, 96 TnusTs & Es-rAEs 1234 (1957); Mudge, The Sim-
plyicaticm of Corporate Fiduciary Transfers, 35 Thusr BUL. 20 (1956); Wilcox,
Stock Transfer Simplified, 45 ILL. B.J. 740 (1957). See also Reports of Committee
on Simplification of Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 96 TRusTs & EsrATEs 861
(1957), 95 id. 904 (1956), 94 id. 885 (1955), 91 id. 765 (1952).
2. Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (No. 8581) (C.C.D.
Md. 1848). Additional cases are collected in CmausT, TnANSFm oF Svocz passim
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cisions, a corporation was under no duty to inquire into the right-
fulness of stock transfers made by fiduciaries.a But the Chief Justice
thought that the corporation was a trustee for everyone interested
in the shares, and that it should take notice of wills as publicly re-
corded documents; when registering a transfer by a fiduciary it
became liable for participation in a breach of trust if it had reason-
able ground for knowledge of the breach. The Taney doctrine pre-
vailed and became a rule imposing a stringent duty of investigation.
Transfer agents began to insist on proof of rightfulness.
The result is a documentary transfer system. In the typical case
of a deceased shareholder, the executor signs the power of attorney
printed on the back of the share certificate, gets a bank or broker
to guarantee the signature, obtains a waiver signed by the appropri-
ate inheritance tax official, and gets the clerk of the probate court
to issue a certificate that the executor has qualified and has not been
removed. With these documents, under the Taney doctrine, the
executor is ordinarily required by the transfer agent to supply a
certified copy of the will; many transfer agents will demand a court
order in addition to or instead of the will. When the documents are
received by the transfer agent, they are carefully examined, and
often additional documents such as affidavits from the heirs are then
demanded.
This system costs the estate money. Professor Conard has esti-
mated the average cost for each block of shares at $10 for documents
and $20 for lawyers' time.4 Where the amount involved is small, the
entire value may be used up in satisfying the transfer agent that
the transfer is rightful. The only possible justification for this burden
is the protection of the estate (1) by the prevention of fraud when
the transfer agent is diligent and (2) by the possibility of recovery
(3d ed. 1958); ScoTT, TRUSTS § 325 (2d ed. 1956); Dewey, The Transfer Agent's
Dilemma: Conflicting Claims to Shares of Stock, 52 HlAw. L. REV. 553 (1939);
Annots., 56 A.L.R. 1199 (1928) (presentation for transfer by fiduciary); 139 A.L.R.
273 (1942) (knowledge or suspicion of conflicting rights); 3 A.L.R.2d 881 (1949)
(stock of infant or incompetent); 7 A.L.R.2d 1240 (1949) (stock of decedent); 22
A.L.R.2d 12 (1952) (remedies).
3. Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jun. 56, 30 Eng. Rep. 891 (Ch. 1796);
Bank of Virginia v. Craig, 50 Va. (6 Leigh) 399 (1835); Hutchins v. State Bank, 47
Mass. (12 Mete.) 421 (1847). For the persistance of the old rule in England, see
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, § 20; Companies Act,
1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 30; Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7,
c. 69, § 27; Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 101; Companies Act,
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 117; In re Perkins, [1890] Q.B. 613, 616; Simpson v.
Molsons' Bank, [1895] A.C. 270 (P.C.) (Can.); Ireland v. Hart, [19021 1 Ch. 522;
GORE-BROWN, HANDBOOK ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 76 (41st ed. 1952); CowEnt,
MODERN COMPANY LAW 389, 393-94, 399-400 (1954); RANKiNC & SPiCEn, COMPANY
LAW 126 (10th ed. 1955); Cower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Cor-
poration Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1397-98 (1956).
4. Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 33, 34 (1957).
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of damages from the corporation when fraud does occur. As for pre-
vention, the protection is illusory: there are many ways to perpe-
trate fraud, and the documentary transfer system merely doses one
of the many doors open to the dishonest fiduciary. As for salvage,
informed opinion has long been very nearly unanimous that the cost
is excessive, and that the system should be changed.
Efforts to ameliorate the situation have had some success with
respect to corporate fiduciaries. Transfer agents sometimes forego
documentation in reliance on an indemnity agreement executed by
a responsible trust company.5 And such fiduciaries are often per-
mitted by statute to hold securities in the name of a nominee, with-
out disclosing the existence of a trust." Interested groups have also
explored the possibilities of developing simplified forms under exist-
ing law and of insuring against transfer risks.' But such measures
have not been much help to the individual fiduciary. The core of
the problem is the Taney doctrine, and most efforts have centered
on legislation to abrogate that doctrine.
Abrogation has its problems. When a responsible corporate fidu-
ciary transfers stock in a large publicly-held corporation, the justifica-
tion for the documentary transfer system is at its weakest. There is
little more sense in making the transfer agent a policeman in such
cases than there would be in asking railroad station agents to check
all ticket-buyers in order to catch absconding trustees. The per-
centage of transfers which involves fraud is very small; the remedy
against the fiduciary is adequate; and the burden on the innocent
transfer is excessive. The same may be said when an individual
fiduciary is covered by an adequate surety bond. If a testator has
directed that his executor serve without bond, the remedy against
him may be quite inadequate, but it can then be said that the tes-
tator deliberately chose to place that risk on his estate.
A harder case can be put, and has been put; it is responsible for
most of the problems in drafting proper legislation. Suppose, in ad-
dition to the fact that the fraudulent fiduciary is an executor serving
without bond, that the corporation is small and closely held, that its
secretary handles its transfers, and that he knows a great deal about
the private affairs of the shareholders. Go one step further: the
president of the corporation is the faithless executor, and the secre-
5. See Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 Mic. L. Rsx'.
843, 846 (1958); Mudge, note 1 supra; Williams, Easing Problems of Stock Transfer,
95 ThusTs & ESTATEs 278 (1956).
6. See ScoTt, TRUsTs § 179.5 (2d ed. 1956); Bogert, Trust Investments: Earmark-
ing or Nominees?, 24 TEXAs L. REv. 417 (1946); Rogers & Chinnis, Stock Transfers
under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and Nominee Statutes, 7 IVAsH. & LE L. REv.
150 (1950); Note, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 963 (1958).
7. See Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 Rocry MT. L. REV. 33, 40(1957).
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tary is counsel to the estate." Should the corporation and the transfer
agent-the secretary-be relieved of all duty of care in such a
case?
To most of us who have worked seriously on the legislative prob-
lem, the answer to the question is Yes. But we have come to that
answer only with difficulty, and after some struggle. Suggestions
have been made that we distinguish between large corporations and
small, or between transfers of large blocks of stocks and transfers of
small blocks. But attempts to write such distinctions in legislative
form have been utterly unsuccessful and have commanded no sig-
nificant support. Qualifications in terms of "actual knowledge," "hon-
esty in fact," "good faith," and the like have a more complex history,
of which more later.
II. TmE UNIFORM FmucLu=s Acr
Statutory assaults on the Taney doctrine began long ago with a
Pennsylvania statute of 1874; by 1922 Delaware, Kentucky, Massa-
chusetts and Illinois had somewhat similar statutesY In 1920 the
National Conference authorized the preparation of a Uniform Fidu-
ciaries Act, and the services of Professor Scott of the Harvard Law
School were engaged. He made an extensive study of the subject of
participation in breach of trust and prepared an act which was
promulgated in 1922.10 Section 3 of the act, dealing with security
transfers, is based upon the Massachusetts statute; by 1957 it had
been substantially adopted in 28 jurisdictions.' During the same
period other statutes similar in purpose were also enacted in at least
9 states.12
8. Cf. Simpson v. Molsons' Bank, [1895] A.C. 270 (P.C.) (Can.) (bank not liable).
9. Pa. Laws 1874, c. 222, § 1, superseded by the UNIFORM FiucnmAuEs ACT.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Pittsburgh Ry., 31 F. Supp. 381, 385 (E.D. Pa. 1939). So
also DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 12, § 1572 (1953); Ill. Laws 1921, p. 382, repealed by Ill.
Laws 1933, c. 308; Ky. Laws 1892, c. 122, § 2, repealed by Ky. Laws 1944, c. 115,
§ 2; Bank of Kentucky v. Winn, 110 Ky. 140, 61 S.W. 32 (1901); MAss. ANN. LAws
c. 203, § 21 (1955); REPORT OF THE NEW Yomc LAW RLviSION COMrMISSION 183-
90 (1937); Conard, A New Deal For Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 Mici. L. Rv.
843, 847-51 (1958).
10. 9B UNIF. LAws A-N. 10 (1957); Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34
HASv. L. REv. 454, 465-67 (1921); see 1921 HAND3OOI OF Tim NATIONAL CONFEI-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 209-10 [hereinafter cited as HAND-
BOOK]; 1922 HANDBOOK 339-40.
11. 9B UNIF. LAWS ANN. 10-11, 18 (1957) lists the following: Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois (repealed 1957), Indiana,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (§ 3
only), North Carolina, Ohio (omits § 3), Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennesseo, Utah,
Washington (§ 3 only), Wisconsin, Wyoming. See also the following acts enacting § 3
only: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 58-109 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4902 (Corrck
Supp. 1957); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 53, § 73 (1954); N. D. REv. CODE, § 18021 (Supp.
1957); R. I. GEN. LAws § 7-1-19 (1956).
12. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2411 (Deering 1953); Evinger v. MacDougall, 28 Cal.
[Vol. 43:193
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The Uniform Fiduciaries Act applies to any securities issued by a
corporation, association or trust, but only if the securities are regis-
tered in the name of a fiduciary. "Fiduciary" is defined broadly to
include receivers and agents as well as trustees, executors, guardians
and the like. When applicable, the act eliminates the duty of inquiry
established under the Taney doctrine; if the fiduciary transfers the
securities, the issuer or transfer agent is liable for registering the
transfer "only where registration of the transfer is made with actual
knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obliga-
tion as fiduciary in making the transfer, or with knowledge of such
facts that the action in registering the transfer amounts to bad faith."
"Bad faith" is not defined, but "good faith" is defined in terms of
honesty, without regard to negligence.
The "actual knowledge" qualification was contained in the Massa-
chusetts model, and is stated in one Canadian case.13 The additional
"bad faith" language was not in Professor Scott's original draft, but
was suggested in the Conference. 14 Decisions under other sections of
the Uniform Fiduciaries Act have interpreted similar language to
exonerate banks from any duty of inquiry and from any liability for
negligence, 5 and the New York Court of Appeals has said that under
section 3 "the measure of responsibility . . . is restricted as in Eng-
land." 16 Unlike the English law, however, the Uniform Fiduciaries
Act does not forbid the corporation to receive notice of a trust; in
several cases the corporation, after making some inquiry, has been
held responsible for what it has learned." In some of those cases the
App. 2d 175, 82 P.2d 194 (1938); CozN. Gm. STAT. § 2911d (Supp. 1955); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 295.230 (1958); L.& GEN. STAT. § 1208 (Dart 1939); Md. Laws 1927,
c. 671, repealed by UNffor FmuLr Es Acr (1929); Omo REv. CODE § 1708.28
(Page Supp. 1957); Pirtle, The New Ohio Securities Transfer Statute and Conflict of
Laws, 22 OGio Op. 539 (1942); Pirtle, Modification in Ohio of Doctrine That a Cor-
poration Is Trustee for Its Shareholders, 20 Omo Op. 464 (1941); Pirtle, Further Re-
marks Concerning the Transfer of Corporate Securities in Ohio, 21 Omo Op. 272
(1941); O=.t. STAT. ANN . tit. 18, § 1.118 (1953); Va. Acts 1948, p. 351, repealed, Va.
Acts 1956, c. 428, § 1; Wis. STAT. Asw. § 180.85 (West 1957).
13. See Simpson v. Molsons' Bank, [1895] A.C. 270, 279 (P.C.) (Can.).
14. See 9B UNIF. LAws ANN. 18 (1957).
15. Colby v. Riggs Natl Bank, 92 F.2d. 183 (D.C. Cir. 1937); New Amsterdam
Cas. Co. v. National Banking Co., 117 N.J. Eq. 264, 175 At. 609 (Ch. 1934), affd,
119 N.J. Eq. 540, 182 Atl 824 (Err. & App. 1936); Transport Trucking Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 61 N.M. 320, 300 P.2d 476 (1956); Davis v. Pennsylvania Co., 337 Pa.
456, 12 A.2d 66 (1940).
16. Stark v. National City Bank, 278 N.Y. 388, 401, 16 N.E.2d 376, 381 (1938); cf.
Carolina Tel & Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 168 F.2d 489, 495 (4th Cir. 1948); 'Mudge v.
Mitchell Hutchins & Co., 322 ]11. App. 409, 425-27, 54 N.E.2dt 708, 714-15 (1944).
17. Seymour v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 665 (1940); First Nat'l Bank v. Pittsburgh Ry., 31 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.
1939); Harris v. General Motors Corp., 263 App. Div. 261, 32 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 691,43 N.E.2d 84 (1942); cf. Hertz v. Record Pub. Co., 105 F.
Supp. 200 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Daily v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 76 F. Supp. 349, 371
(N.D. l11. 1947).
1958]
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opinions use language which suggests that imprudence may be the
equivalent of bad faith.'" And there always lurks the possibility that
a corporation's "actual knowledge" may include everything known
by hundreds of employees.' 9
Whatever its effect in litigation, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act has
not had the desired effect on the practices of professional transfer
agents, although the Ohio and Massachusetts acts seem to have had
partial success in practice.20 Various reasons have been given, but
the most significant one seems to be that the risk of liability for regis-
tering a wrongful transfer is far greater than the risk of liability for
refusing to register a rightful transfer.2
III. RECENT LEGISLATION
The Unifarm Commercial Code. The draftsmen of article 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code therefore made a new attempt to sim-
plify fiduciary security transfers. 22 As promulgated in 1952 and en-
acted in Pennsylvania in 1953, effective in 1954,'3 the Code dealt
with liability both for wrongful registration and for wrongful refusal
to transfer. Section 8-401 (1) stated the issuer's duty to register trans-
fer if three conditions were met: (a) full indorsement for transfer,
(b) no knowledge of unrightfulness and no duty to inquire into
rightfulness, and (c) proof of payment or waiver of taxes or consent
to transfer. Section 8-401(2) then negated liability when the duty
was performed. Section 8-402 forbade the issuer to require more
than certain specified evidence, "unless the issuer has notice that the
person signing the indorsement has no power to make the indorse-
ment." The specified evidence for a fiduciary was "an indorsement
signed by the fiduciary, a guarantee of that signature, and proof
that the person signing was such fiduciary at the date of signing."
Section 8-403 limited the issuer's duty of inquiry into rightfulness to
cases where "he has notice of another claim to an interest in the se-
18. Cf. Watterson v. Tremaine, 24 N.Y.S.2d 830, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ("Good faith
requires an honest effort to ascertain the facts. ... ).
19. But see Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 HAnv. L. REv. 454, 481
(1921), denying liability "merely because it appears that at some stage by piccing
together all the facts known to different employees a breach of trust would become
more or less apparent."
20. See Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 Mimi. L. REv. 843,
844-51 (1958).
21. Id. at 851-61.
22. See Bunn, Article 8- A Law for the Transfer of Investment Securities, 1952
vis. L. REv. 339; Israels, Article 8- Investment Securities, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PaOB. 249 (1951); Walker, Uniform Commercial Code Article 8- Investment Securi-
ties, 14 OMo ST. L.J. 57 (1953); Notes, 22 TENN. L. REv. 842 (1953), 103 U. PA. L.
1Ev. 209 (1954).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon 1953); see Braucher, Legislative History of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 CoLUm. L. REv. 798 (1958).
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curity." But "notice that the transfer is to the fiduciary in his indi-
vidual capacity" or that the proceeds "are made payable in cash or
to the fiduciary individually' was enough to create a duty of
inquiry. Section 8-404 imposed liability on the issuer if the transfer
was wrongful, unless there was a duty to transfer under section
8-401; section 8-406 put the transfer agent under the same obliga-
tions as the issuer.
The Wisconsin Statute. Also in 1953, Wisconsin adopted a statute
patterned on the simplification provisions of the Code.24 The Wis-
consin statute does not cover registered bonds, and does not provide
for the issuer's duty to register transfer. Moreover, it attempts to deal
with the problem of vicarious knowledge by limiting it to knowledge
of the individual conducting the transaction and knowledge he
would have acquired if other agents had exercised due diligence.
Criticism of the Code. Criticism at hearings held by the New York
Law Revision Commission during 1954 focussed on other aspects of
article 8; and Supplement No. 1 to the Code, published by the spon-
soring organizations early in 1955, proposed only minor changes in
the simplification provisions.2 5 A provision was added to section
8-402 that the status of an indorser "at the date of signing" might
be established by a certificate dated within a reasonable period be-
fore presentation; and a provision was added to section 8-403 that
a duty of inquiry could be discharged "by any reasonable means,
including" a definite adverse claims procedure.
Later in 1955 Mr. Christy, the author of the standard treatise on
transfer of stock, published a vigorous attack on the Code provi-
sions.26 On the recommendation of a committee of which he was a
member, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
adopted a resolution urging state legislatures to adopt simplifying
acts and referring to the statutes of Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wis-
consin as possible precedents. 7 Early in 1956, in response to that
24. Wis. STAT. ANx. § 180.85 (West 1957).
25. UNiFoom CoMNECIAL. CODE, Supp. No. 1 at 55-58, 170, 173-74 (1955); see
Thomas, In re Article 8, 28 TmE,. L.Q. 582, 595-601 (1955).
26. Christy, supra notes 1, 2.
27. 80 A.B.A. REP. 167-68 (1955):
Whereas, The responsibility of corporations to inquire into the property of
tranders of their shares by fiduciaries is an anomaly never included in the common
law and equity of England; and
Whereas, This responsibility is anachronistic in the light of the modern rule of
negotiability of shares; and
Whereas, This responsibility has led to expensive and time-consuming documentary
requirements which are productive of unfavorable lawyer-client relations; and
Whereas, Three states- Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin - have adopted sim-
plifying acts which may serve as legislative precedents; now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the legislatures of the respective states are urged to adopt statutes
which will eliminate the present excessive burden of documentation required for the
transfer of stock by fiduciaries.
1958]
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resolution, the Conference appointed a committee to draft a new
uniform act which would simplify security transfers. At about the
same time, the New York Law Revision Commission made its re-
port on the Code: it approved the policy of section 8-402, limiting
the documentation an issuer may require, but disapproved the im-
position by section 8-403 of a duty to inquire into transfers by a
fiduciary for his individual benefit.28
The Model Act. Working with the responsible committees of the
American Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar Association,
Mr. Christy prepared a draft of an act finally published in 1957 as
the Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act. 20 The Model Act,
like section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, is simply an exonera-
tion statute for issuers and transfer agents. It says nothing of any
duty to register transfers; it negates any duty of inquiry when a
security is transferred to or by a fiduciary. No exception is made for
"actual knowledge" or "bad faith"; the only exceptions to the rule
of nonliability depend on written notice. An adverse claims pro-
cedure is provided for cases in which written notice is delivered
to the corporation.
The Model Act is not limited, as the Fiduciaries Act is, to securi-
ties registered in the name of the fiduciary. Like statutes enacted
in California and New York,30 the Model Act applies also to transfers
by a fiduciary of securities registered in the name of a deceased per-
son, minor or incompetent. In such cases the Model Act provides
that "the corporation shall obtain a copy of a document showing
his appointment and, if court appointed, certified by the clerk of the
appointing court within sixty days before the date of transfer, but
the corporation is charged with notice of only that part of the docu-
ment which provides for the appointment."
The Model Act was enacted at 1957 legislative sessions in Con-
necticut, Delaware and Illinois.31 It is reported that in cases covered
by the Model Act transfer agents in Illinois have dispensed with
the production of wills, trust agreements, court orders and other
documents traditionally required. The situation in Connecticut and
Delaware is less clear, but there is hope that transfer agents there
will follow the lead of Illinois.3 2
28. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), 43-44 (1956); see Braucher, The 1956 Revision of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L. REV. 3, 13-14 (1956).
29. See Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries" Stock Transfers, 56 Micix. L. REV. 843,
862-65 (1958); Jolls, Illinois Adopts New Statute on Security Transfer Simplification,
96 TRusTs & ESTATES 641 (1957).
30. CALF. CORP. CODE § 2412 (Deering 1953); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-k;
see REPORT OF THE NEWV YoRix LAW REVISION COMMIssION 129, 166-69 (1937).
31. Conn. Pub. Acts 1957, No. 573; Del. Laws 1957, c. 271; ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, §§
439.50-.57 (1957).
32. See Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 Micu. L. IES'. 843,
862-65 (1958).
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The 1956 Revision of the Code. The writer was chairman of the
Conference committee appointed in response to the ABA resolu-
tion of 1955,33 and he and other members of the committee were
also participants in the revision of the Uniform Commercial Code
during 1956. The committee based its work on early drafts of the
Model Act, but revised the language to conform to the terminology
and style of the Uniform Commercial Code.34 At the annual meet-
ing of the Conference in 1956 the committee submitted a tentative
draft which limited the issuer's duty of inquiry to two cases: (1) where
a notification of adverse claim is received, and (2) where the issuer
elects to investigate a transfer and both requires and obtains a
document which gives it reason to know of an adverse claim. The
committee asked policy guidance on the question whether the ex-
oneration of the issuer and transfer agent from liability should be
limited to cases where "the individual conducting the transaction on
behalf of the issuer acts honestly in fact." After full discussion, the
Conference voted by an overwhelming majority to omit any such
limitation, and tentative approval was given to the basic policies
expressed in the draft.
It was made clear to the Conference that the proposal would be
submitted to the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code
if thus approved. The committee informed the Editorial Board and
its subcommittee on article 8 of the action of the Conference and
submitted a draft of amendments to incorporate into the Code the
policies approved by the Conference. Revision of the Code to meet
criticism by the New York Law Revision Commission and others
was then under way, and the Editorial Board approved a thorough
overhaul of the Code provisions on indorsement, signature guarantee
and registration of transfer.3 5
The revised Code was completed late in 1956, and was enacted
in Massachusetts in 1957, effective October 1, 1958, and in Kentucky
in 1958, effective July 1, 1960. 6 A manual prepared by a committee
of Massachusetts bank lawyers advises bankers who act as transfer
agents that they may safely transfer fiduciary securities in sole reli-
ance on a signature guarantee made in a Code state or on an out-
of-state guarantee accompanied by a certificate of incumbency;
bankers are warned not to require wills and other controlling instru-
33. See note 27 supra.
34. See Report of Special Committee on Uniform Act on Simplification of Security
Transfers, 1956 HANDBOOr, 285.
35. Sections 8-306, 8-308, 8-311, 8-312 and 8-401 through 8-406. The amend-
ments are shown in 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code; the amended Code is printed as UNwuroRx Co3,mcw.L CoDE, 1957
OsmacrL TEXT WrrH Comsers (1958). See Israels, Investment Securities as Nego-
tiable Paper-Article 8 of the Uniform, Commercial Code, 13 Bus. LAw. 676 (1958).36. MAss. Azr. LAws c. 106 (Supp. 1958); Ky. Laws 1958, e. 77.
1958]
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ments.3 7 Professor Conard has predicted complete simplification of
wholly intrastate transfers, but indicates that there is some doubt
whether Illinois transfer agents will give effect to the Massachusetts
Code.38
Completion of the Uniform Act. The Conference committee re-
ported in 1957 that the revised Code fully incorporated the policies
approved by the 1956 Conference, and redrew its proposed Uniform
Act to follow closely the relevant Code provisions."I At the 1957
annual meeting of the Conference the proposal was taken up as a
final draft, approved section by section, and recommended for final
adoption. But upon representations by members of the responsible
committee of the American Bar Association that they had not had
time to consider changes from prior drafts and that enactment of
the Model Act in three states had changed the situation, the recom-
mendation was rescinded and the matter put over for a year to per-
mit further discussion.
During 1957-1958 the Conference committee met with an ad-
visory committee which included representatives of the American
Bar Association and Illinois State Bar Association committees, of
the subcommittee on article 8 of the Code, and of organizations of
transfer agents and corporate secretaries. Representatives of the
New York Stock Exchange also participated actively; they had had
experience with the conversion of a model act into the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act, and had taken the lead in securing enactment of that
act, which included a section exonerating third parties.
40
In view of reports that the Model Act was being relied on by the
Chicago transfer agents, the terminology and style of the Model
Act were substituted in the Uniform Act for those of the Code.
Numerous minor problems, arising primarily from the insistence of
the Conference committee that the substance of the act must be
compatible with the structure of the Code, were resolved by dis-
cussion and compromise. A few problems of substance gave diffi-
culty, as described below in connection with the veto of the New
York bill to enact the Model Act, but finally a revised draft was
ready for the 1958 annual meeting of the Conference and, with
some changes, was finally approved.
Veto of the Model Act in New York. The Model Act was intro-
duced in the 1958 session of the New York legislature.41 The bill had
37. B. Nurns MANUAL ON THE UNIFOR13. COM'MERCIAL CODE § 6.9 (1958).
38. Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 Micii. L. Rsv. 843,
865-69 (1958).
39. See 1957 HANDBOOK 197.
40. See 1956 HANDBOOK 253; 1957 HANDBOOK 117-21; UNIFOnM GIFrS TO MINoI1s
Acr § 6.
41. N.Y. Assembly Bill Int. No. 972, Pr. No. 4569, Senate No. 4453, Rec. 467
(1958); Memorandum of the Governor, April 22, 1958.
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the support of lawyers, bankers and several large corporations but
was opposed by the Surrogates' Association and the organized
surety companies. Initial opposition by the New York Stock Ex-
change and organized brokers and dealers was withdrawn when a
new section was added to exonerate banks, brokers and others as
well as corporations and transfer agents. The amended bill passed
both houses but was vetoed by the governor.
The veto message objected to the new section as "badly drafted
and too broad in scope." It also referred to the probability that a
Uniform Act would be promulgated later the same year, and said
"it would be advisable to have an opportunity to examine the Uni-
form Act" before enacting "the proposed fundamental change in the
responsibility of transfer agents and others dealing with securities
of fiduciaries." The governor also quoted the objections of the Sur-
rogates' Association to the absence of any exception for transfers to
the fiduciary himself or for "knowledge" or "notice" or 'lack of good
faith," and to the shortness of the period specified for court action
by an adverse claimant
The points raised in the governor's message were given further
consideration in the preparation of the Uniform Act. Representa-
tives of the objecting organizations were invited to meet with the
Conference committee and its advisory committee, and did so. A
new section was prepared to deal with the liability of banks, brokers
and other persons participating in a transfer of securities. The pe-
riod for court action by an adverse claimant was changed from the
15 days of the Model Act to the 80 days provided in the Code and
in the Connecticut version of the Model Act.
The final version of the Uniform Act made no change, however,
with respect to transfers to the fiduciary himself or as to knowledge
or bad faith. As to self-dealing, the Conference committee stood
firm on the ground that an exception which prevented simplifica-
tion in the very common case of the executrix-widow-sole legatee
would greatly impair the usefulness of the act. Mr. Christy, appar-
ently in the hope of salvaging something from the wreckage, sug-
gested an amendment placing the burden of proof of bad faith on
the person who sued the corporation or transfer agent, and the
committee submitted such a provision to the 1958 annual meeting
of the Conference. But the Conference was nearly unanimous that
such a provision would defeat the objective of simplification, and
the provision was deleted.
IV. PRoVIsiONs OF THm UNrFonf AcT
The Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security Trans-
fers, as promulgated, follows the general scheme of the Model Act.
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But section 3 of the Model Act is expanded and broken into sec-
tions 3 and 4 of the Uniform Act, and section 7 of the Uniform Act
is new. The section titles of the Uniform Act follow:
1. Definitions.
2. Registration in the Name of a Fiduciary.
3. Assignment by a Fiduciary.
4. Evidence of Appointment or Incumbency.
5. Adverse Claims.
6. Non-Liability of Corporation and Transfer Agent.
7. Non-Liability of Third Persons.
8. Territorial Application.
9. Tax Obligations.
10. Uniformity of Interpretation.
11. Short Title.
12. Repeal.
13. Time of Taking Effect.
Scope. Primarily the act restricts the liability of a "corporation"
or its "transfer agent" for registering transfer of a "security" by a
"fiduciary." "Corporation" means a public or private corporation, as-
sociation, or trust issuing a security. "Transfer agent" includes em-
ployees of the issuer as well as corporate agents. "Security" includes
bonds and other securities, if registered as to ownership, as well as
stock. "Fiduciary" includes executors, administrators and guardians
as well as trustees and nominees, but does not include agents, cor-
porate officers, receivers or trustees in bankruptcy.
Thus the act is comprehensive as to types of issuers, securities,
and trusts and estates: it applies to transfers out of the name of a
decedent, minor or incompetent as well as to transfers by a fiduciary
who is the registered owner. But the act does not deal comprehen-
sively with the duty of the issuer to register transfers or with its
liability for wrongful registration; the provisions are merely that in
certain defined circumstances there is no liability. Section 7 limits
the liability of signature guarantors and other third persons, but
again only in specified circumstances. Affirmative provision for lia-
bility in cases where the act does not apply is left to other bodies
of law.
Lack of Power: Forgery. In general the Uniform Act, like the
Model Act, observes the distinction laid down by Mr. Christy,4 2 that
the transfer agent should be relieved of responsibility for transfers
in breach of trust but should continue to be responsible for register-
ing "void" transfers. Thus neither act deals with transfers on a forged
signature, as to which the issuer acts at its peril both at common
42. See CmHRSTY, TA -sFm OF STocK §§ 2-3, 243, 256-57 (3d ed. 1958); Christy,
Responsibilities in the Transfer of Stock, 53 Micn. L. REv. 701, 704-05 (1955).
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law and under the Uniform Commercial Code.43 The Uniform Act
in section 2 assumes an effective assignment by or on behalf of the
old registered owner;4 sections 3 and 4 are explicitly limited to
transfers "pursuant to an assignment by a fiduciary." If the assign-
ment is made by a forger instead of by the registered owner or the
fiduciary, the transfer is not within the quoted language and there
is no transfer or other action "authorized by this act" within the
meaning of section 6, the section limiting the liability of the cor-
poration or transfer agent. A signature on behalf of the fiduciary by
an agent acting without authority stands on the same footing.
Lack of Power: Purported Fiduciaries. Where the assignment is
made by a purported fiduciary who is not in fact serving in the ca-
pacity he professes, the Uniform Act does not treat the transfer as
"void" in all cases. If the security is once properly registered in the
nam6 of a fiduciary or a purported fiduciary, on the basis of a proper
signature by the former registered owner, section 2 permits the cor-
poration and transfer agent to "assume without inquiry that the
newly registered owner continues to be the fiduciary" until it re-
ceives written notice to the contrary. 5 The same rule also applies,
for example, where registered ownership is properly changed from
the name of a decedent to the name of his executor; subsequent re-
moval of the executor affects the corporation and transfer agent only
if the statutory written notice is received.
Transfer on the signature of a purported fiduciary who is not the
registered owner, on the other hand, would seem to be the equiva-
lent of forgery. In such cases section 2 does not help the transfer
agent, since the wrongful transfer giving rise to liability is com-
plete before the statutory permission, thereafter" to assume that
the fiduciary status "continues," becomes operative. And there is no
"assignment by a fiduciary" to make sections 3 and 4 applicable. The
absolute liability imposed in such cases under prior law is therefore
not impaired.
Under section 4, on transfer "pursuant to an assignment by a fi-
duciary who is not the registered owner" the transfer agent "shall
obtain" specified evidence of appointment or incumbency. If the
specified evidence is not obtained, the transfer seems not to be
made "in a manner authorized by this act" so as to make applicable
the nonliability provisions of section 6, and there may be a risk of
liability for participating in a breach of fiduciary duty as well as the
risk of absolute liability if the purported fiduciary is an impostor. A
43. See CHmsR, TRN srm oF STocz §§ 242-48 (3d ed. 1958); Ux1Forn Comz-
RmCIaL CODE §§ 8-311, 8-404.
44. See Commissioners' Comment to Section 2.
45. Cf. UN'FoMI Co.NINcMC.. CODE § 8-808 (8)(a). See Christy, Responsibilities
in the Transfer of Stock 58 Mic. L. REv. 701, 719-20 (1955).
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signature guarantee may cover the risk of absolute liability but not
the risk of breach of trust.40
On the other hand, even if the specified evidence is obtained, it
may sometimes be the fact that no valid appointment was ever made
or that the fiduciary has been removed between the date of the
evidence and the date of the signature. The risk of absolute liability
in such cases is not eliminated by the Uniform Act; but that risk
is probably covered by the signature guarantee, and it has tradi-
tionally been treated by transfer agents as an acceptable business
risk.47 Under both the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code, the effectiveness of the signature seems to be
determined as of the date of signing rather than as of the subsequent
time of delivery or registration. 48
Lack of Power: Court Orders. Statutes often require that particu-
lar types of fiduciaries obtain a court order before transferring such
securities, and such statutes sometimes make a transfer without
court order "void." Section 3 of the Uniform Act, in language simi-
lar to that of the Model Act, permits the corporation or transfer
agent to "assume without inquiry that the fiduciary has complied
with any controlling instrument and with the law of the jurisdiction
governing the fiduciary relationship, including any law requiring the
fiduciary to obtain court approval of the transfer."" This language
seems adequate to protect the corporation and transfer agent from
liability even though the transfer is for other purposes 'void" be-
cause no court order was obtained. But it has been suggested that
a court-order statute might impliedly repeal the quoted provision if
re-enacted thereafter, and that an amendment to the court-order
statute would be appropriate to avoid apparent conflict. °
Inquiry and Notice. Like the Model Act, the Uniform Act abol-
ishes the traditional duty of the transfer agent to inquire into
breaches of trust. Section 2 negates any such duty when a security
is first registered in the name of a fiduciary, and section 3 permits
the corporation and transfer agent to "assume without inquiry" that
an assignment by a fiduciary "is within his authority and capacity
and is not in breach of his fiduciary duties." That permission is
granted "except as otherwise provided in this act," and three excep-
tions are provided in the act: (1) Section 2 excepts written notice
46. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-308(3), 8-312(1)(b). See 2 RiL,olrr oF
THE Nmv YORtK LAw REVISION COMMISSION 839-44 (1954); BANKERS MANUAL ON Tile
UNIFORM COMMELRCL.L CODE § 6.7 (1958); note 37 supra.
47. See CmusTy, TRANSFER OF STOCK § 85 (3d. 1958); cf. UNIFORM CO,%NIEI1-
CIAL CODE § 8-402(1)(c) and comment 3.
48. UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 20; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-308(0).
But see CHRISTY, TRANSFER OF STOCK §§ 61, 225a (3d ed. 1958).
49. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-308(7), 8-403(3)(b).
50. See Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 33, 43-45
(1957).
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that a fiduciary registered as owner is no longer acting as fiduciary
with respect to the particular security; (2) Section 4 requires the
transfer agent to obtain evidence of appointment or incumbency
when the assignment is made by a fiduciary who is not the regis-
tered owner; (8) Section 5 provides for written notice of a claim
of beneficial interest adverse to the transfer. No exception is made
for cases of "actual knowledge" or "bad faith," but there is no in-
tention to impair the responsibility imposed by the general law of
torts on a person who consciously aids and abets a fraudulent
conspiracy.51
The Uniform Act does not spell out the consequences of inquiry.
One who inquires cannot well be said to "assume without inquiry."
Literally, therefore, the act seems to leave his liability to the prior
law, which can be summed up in the maxim that he who sets
his hand to the plow must plow to the end of the furrow.52 Such a
conclusion is consistent with the act's main purpose, which is to
induce transfer agents to forego inquiry. And the conclusion is con-
firmed by section 4(b), dealing with the evidence of appointment
or incumbency to be obtained when a successor to an inter vivos
trustee seeks transfer of securities registered in the name of his pre-
decessor. In such a case, a copy of the trust instrument may be
appropriate evidence, and section 4(b) expressly provides that the
transfer agent is charged with notice of the contents of the docu-
ment only to the extent that they relate directly to the appointment
or incumbency. That provision is meaningful only on the assump-
tion that unnecessary inquiry might create a duty of further inquiry.
There is another risk if the transfer agent makes an inquiry which
the act renders unnecessary. The principle seems to be well estab-
lished that unreasonable refusal to transfer may result in liability
for substantial damages.5 3 A refusal which would formerly have been
reasonable because of the stringent duty of inquiry imposed on the
transfer agent may be unreasonable when that duty has been abol-
ished by the act.
Written Notice; Adverse Claims. Two types of written notice are
provided for in the Uniform Act The section 2 notice "that the fi-
duciary is no longer acting as such with respect to the particular
security" may apparently be informal: a request to change the ad-
dress and payee to whom dividend checks are to be sent, for ex-
ample, might be enough. The section 5 notice of adverse claim is
51. See Commissioners' Comment to § 6.
52. See note 17 supra; Cf. UNTFoRAL COMMC1AUL CODE §§ 8-402(4), 8-403(1)
(b).
58. London, Paris & American Bank v. Aronstein, 117 Fed. 601 (9th Cir. 1902),
cert. denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902); Tobias v. Wolverine Mining Co., 52 Idaho 576, 17
P.2d 338 (1932); see Conard, A New Deal For Fiduciaries Stock Transfers, 56 Mici.
L. REv., 843,856 (1958); cf. UNrFoam CoM tixcuAL. CODE § 8-401(2) and comment 2.
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prescribed in more detail: it is not effective unless the written
notice identifies the claimant, the registered owner and the issue of
which the security is a part, provides an address for communica-
tions directed to the claimant and is received before the transfer."
But it would seem that the section 2 notice would commonly satisfy
section 5 as well. Thus a notice to change the designation and sig-
nature for the checking account of a fiduciary would seem inade-
quate as notice to the transfer department of the same bank, since
it would not refer to his status "with respect to the particular se-
curity." Similarly, notice from the obituary columns of the daily
newspapers would not seem to satisfy the language of either section.
The requirement that the notice be "written" is not likely to be
very significant. Common courtesy and the desire for good relations
with the public are likely to result in receptive answers to telephone
calls, and testimony that the transfer agent accepted telephonic no-
tice is likely to seem credible. It may then be argued that the statute
has been satisfied by the notes made by the transfer agent, or that
the statute has been waived. Experience with statutes requiring
that an order to stop payment of a check be in writing indicates
that such arguments are likely to prevail. 54
Once the section 2 notice is received, the act seems to leave the
corporation and transfer agent to the prior law, under which a sub-
sequent transfer would be made at the issuer's peril. Upon receipt
of a "notice of a claim of beneficial interest adverse to the transfer,"
however, section 5(b) gives the corporation or transfer agent a path
to follow to avoid liability. That path is made available even though
the notice does not satisfy the formal requirements, as for example
where the notice is oral. When the security is later presented for
transfer, the corporation or transfer agent may send notice of the
presentation to the claimant by registered or certified mail. If this
path is taken, the transfer must be withheld for thirty days after
the mailing and then must be made unless restrained by court order.
As a practical matter, it seems likely that adverse claimants will
sometimes seek to avoid court proceedings. In such cases, if the
claim seems meritorious, the transfer agent may be willing to with-
hold the transfer beyond the thirty days upon the filing of an in-
demnity bond. The Uniform Act would not then deny liability, but
the corporation and transfer agent would be protected by the bond.
Nothing in the Uniform Act seems to prevent this procedure."
Liability of Third Persons. Section 7 has no counterpart in the
Model Act. It had its origin in reports of fears on the part of Chicago
54. Stamford State Bank v. Miles, 186 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); cf. UNm-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-408 and comment 6.
55. Cf. UNIFOLM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-403(2) (b), expressly authorizing such a
procedure.
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brokers arising after Chicago transfer agents began to simplify fi-
duciary transfers in reliance on the Model Act. Brokers have com-
monly made little or no investigation of fiduciary transfers, even
when they guarantee fiduciary signatures. Their normal familiarity
with their customers provides some assurance against liability on
the guarantee, but it seems likely that they have relied heavily on
the diligent inquiry made by the transfer agent to uncover cases
both of lack of power and of breach of trust. Moreover, if the
wronged beneficiary or the successor fiduciary has a clear remedy
against the issuer, he may not make a claim against the broker for
participation in breach of trust.
Thus the elimination of inquiry by the transfer agent and the
exoneration of the issuer from liability might result in increased
exposure of the broker to claims, even though the law governing
the broker's liability were not changed. According to Professor
Scott, a broker is liable for participation in breach of trust if he has
"notice" of the breach, but is under no duty of inquiry when he
acts as agent even though he knows a trustee is involved.5c When
he acts as a dealer, however, Professor Scott says the broker has the
same duty as any other purchaser; and other authorities indicate
that even the agent-broker may have a duty of inquiry.57 It has been
argued that such a duty is contemplated by Rule 405 of the Board
of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange, requiring "due dili-
gence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer [and]
every order," although that rule is probably designed merely to pre-
serve the broker's solvency for the benefit of others who deal with
him.
Hence there was a real danger that under the Model Act brokers
might begin to require documentation of fiduciary transfers. The
objective of simplification would be largely defeated if the bottle-
neck were moved from the office of the transfer agent to the office
of the broker. Banks which guarantee signatures or otherwise parti-
cipate in transfers are in much the same legal position as the broker,
and might also insist on documentation. At the urging of the New
York Stock Exchange, therefore, those preparing the Uniform Act
undertook to follow the lead of the Uniform Commercial Code in
abolishing any duty on the part of third persons to inquire into
breaches of trust. There seemed to be an incongruity in the Code
provisions, however: as to ordinary commercial paper, an excep-
tion was made for "actual knowledge," while as to investment se-
56. See 3 Sco-rr, T s-rs § 326.2 (2d ed. 1956); cf. UNn'orlM Co.ntmeCL CODE
§§ 8-304(2), 8-318. See also Cooper v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 38 App. Div. 020, 57 N.Y.
Supp. 925 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
57. See 1 BLACK, STOCK EXCRANs, STocKBaomts AND Cumsrons § 596 (1940);
MEYERSTocBRoKEmms N SCKc ExCHANEs 9 127, 130 (1931).
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curities "reason to know" created a duty of inquiry."8 It was thought
that stocks and bonds should be no less negotiable than promissory
notes, and the "actual knowledge" test was therefore adopted.
Section 7(a) is the result. Applying to any person who partici-
pates in a transfer of registered securities by or to a fiduciary,
it negates liability for participation in breach of trust "by reason of
failure to inquire whether the transaction involves such a breach."
The provision expressly covers signature guarantors, as to whom
it restates the case law.9 The exception for "actual knowledge" is in
terms which place the burden of proof on the claimant: "unless it
is shown that he acted with actual knowledge." Actual knowledge
of an organization, according to a Commissioners' comment, is not
to result merely from "piecing together all the facts known to dif-
ferent employees"; probably the standard in such cases is one of
due diligence in the internal communications of the organization. 0
Signature Guarantors. The Uniform Act does not attempt to an-
swer the much-disputed questions concerning the scope of the sig-
nature guarantee."' In addition to the express provision of section
7(a) on the signature guarantor's liability for participation in breach
of trust, however, section 7(b) seeks to prevent increased risk to
the guarantor by virtue of simplification by the transfer agent. Once
the transfer has been registered, section 7(b) provides that liability
on the guarantee does not run to any person as against whom the
act exonerates the corporation or transfer agent.
The operation of section 7(b) may be illustrated by supposing
a transfer by an executor which is "void" because no court order
was obtained. Even a bona fide purchaser might be required to
restore the security to the estate, and might then have recourso
against the signature guarantor. Under the traditional practice, this
risk is minimized by the fact that the transfer will not be registered
by the transfer agent unless the court order is submitted. By rea-
son of the Uniform Act, the corporation and transfer agent incur no
liability to the purchaser by making the transfer without obtaining
the court order. Under section 7(b), therefore, if the transfer agent
makes the transfer, the signature guarantor is not liable to the pur-
chaser on the guarantee.
Conflict of Laws. Section 8(a) provides that the rights and duties
58. Compare UNIFOR-M' COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-304 with § 8-304( 2). Under § 1-
201(25) "knowledge" means actual knowledge; "notice" includes "reason to know."
59. Judd v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 53 Ga. App. 706, 186 S.E. 752 (1936); Mudge v.
Mitchell Hutchins & Co., 322 Il. App. 409, 54 N.E.2d 708 (1944); cf. Jennie Clarkson
Home v. Missouri Ry., 182 N.Y. 47, 74 N.E. 571 (1905).
60. See Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust, 34 Harv. L. REv. 454 (1921),
quoted in Commissioners' Comment to § 7; Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201
(27).
61. See note 46 supra.
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of the corporation and its transfer agents in making fiduciary trans-
fers are governed by the law of the jurisdiction under whose laws
the corporation is organized. This accords with all known American
authority with respect to stock transfers,6 2 and probably will not
cause difficulty as applied to bond transfers or in courts of foreign
nations.' Under the Model Act, which contains a similar provision,
many transfer agents are reported to have insisted on a "three-
contact approach": fiduciary transfers are simplified only if pro-
tection is afforded by the laws of the state of incorporation, the state
of registration of transfer, and the state of fiduciary administration.
In view of this attitude, the practical success of the movement for
simplification depends on the enactment of simplification statutes
in a large number of states. Section 8(a) will then specify the gov-
erning law.
The "three-contact approach" seems to have very little warrant in
law. The argument that the law of the place of registration applies,
even in the absence of statute, seems to rest on highly theoretical
speculation and remote analogy, and insistence on protection in the
fiduciary's state is said to rest on fear that judges will be incompe-
tent.64 It seems very unlikely that a corporation could successfully
resist liability for wrongful refusal to transfer on the ground that it
was afraid judges would be incompetent.65 Fear of such liability has
not been an effective spur to action in the past; the New York prac-
tice has long been flatly contrary to a clear statement by the New
York Court of Appeals that the applicable law is the same as in
England.66 As a practical matter, it is normally cheaper for the
aggrieved stockholder to comply with an unreasonable demand for
documentation than to bring suit. Nevertheless, there may be some
hope that the "three-contact approach" will give way to a "two-
contact approach."
As to the liabilities of third persons such as banks and brokers,
including signature guarantors, there is no such clear authority for
applying the law of the state of incorporation. The Uniform Act
therefore adopts the traditional territorial approach: section 8(b)
makes section 7 applicable to acts and omissions "in this state'
and to a person who guarantees "in this state." 67
62. See Seymour v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1939); Hiller v.
American TeL & TeL Co., 324 Mass. 24, 84 N.E.2d 548 (1949); REsTATrM NE-r, COx-
srcr oF LAws §§ 53, 182 (1934); UNrwroM CO.rhCIAL CODE § 8-106.
63. See Conard,'A New Deal for Fiduciaries Stock Transfers, 56 MicaL L. REv.
843,869-82 (1958).
64. Id. at 874.
65. See note 53 supra.
66. See note 16 supra.
67. Cf. Pirtle, New Ohio Securities Transfer Statute and Conflict of Laws, 22 Omo
Op. 539 (1942).
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V. CONFOIRMING THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws obviously should not be in the position of simultaneously rec-
ommending for enactment two inconsistent pieces of legislation. The
committee which drafted the Uniform Act was therefore "careful
to avoid recommending provisions which would not be compatible
with the structure of the Code.""8 The Conference, after approving
the Uniform Act, directed the committee to prepare conforming
amendments to the Code, and to submit the amendments to the
sponsors' Editorial Board for the Code.
In fact, drafts of such amendments had already been circulated
by the committee, and promptly after the approval of the Uniform
Act the writer submitted to the Editorial Board a proposed final
draft. The Editorial Board has approved those amendments with
minor changes, and it seems likely that they will be included in Code
bills submitted to the 1959 legislatures in Pennsylvania and other
states.69
Terminology. The conforming amendments so approved make no
effort to reconcile the terminology of the Code with that of the Uni-
form Act. The Code uses the lawyers' terminology which has been
embodied in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act for fifty years, while
the Uniform Act, following the Model Act, uses the jargon of
transfer agents. Thus the power of attorney to register transfer
is an "indorsement" in the Code, an "assignment" in the Uni-
form Act. The "corporation" of the Uniform Act is the "issuer" of
the Code. Under the Code a delivery of a security to a purchaser
is a "transfer" which is later "registered" by a transfer agent; under
the Uniform Act "transfer" is the change in "registered ownership."
The traditional lawyers' terminology has been described as an
"Alice-in-Wonderland vocabulary," 70 but nothing of substance seems
to turn on the words used. The meanings are made quite clear in
both statutes by definition and by context. And any revision of the
terminology of article 8 of the Code would be dangerous unless the
entire Code was reviewed for consistency between articles.
Scope. The Uniform Act is a narrow statute, limited in scope to
some aspects of registration of transfers made by fiduciaries. Ar-
ticle 8 of the Code covers transfers of bearer securities as well; it
deals with the rights and duties of buyers and sellers as well as the
68. See Prefatory Note to UNIFORM ACT FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECUH-
rr TRANSFRS 4 (1958).
69. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Supp. 1958). As to legislative plans for tho Code,
see Schnader, The New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law - The Uni-
form Commercial Code Marches On, 13 Bus. LAw. 646, 672-75 (1958).
70. See Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries' Stock Transfers, 56 MIC. L. flLv.
848, 883 (1958).
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rights of issuers, banks and brokers; it defines the scope of the sig-
nature guarantee and the duty to register transfers as well as liabil-
ity for wrongful registration. Thus the Code governs many situations
which the Uniform Act leaves to the prior law; a number of relevant
Code provisions of this type have been cited above in the analysis
of the Uniform Act. Conformity of the Code to the substance of
the Uniform Act does not require revision of such provisions, but
some review of them was desirable to avoid incongruities within the
Code.
The Proposed Amendments. The amendments to the Code ap-
proved by the Editorial Board relate primarily to section 8-402, "As-
surance That Indorsements are Effective," and to section 8-403 on the
issuer's "Limited Duty of Inquiry." In addition substantive amend-
ments are proposed in section 8-304, "Notice to Purchaser of Adverse
Claims," and in section 8-318, "No Conversion by Good Faith De-
livery."
Evidence of Appointment or Incumbency. The theory of the Code
provisions on evidence of appointment or incumbency of a fiduciary
is somewhat different from the theory of the Uniform Act. Under
section 4 of the Uniform Act, the obtaining of the evidence seems
to be a condition of obtaining immunity from liability for partici-
pation in breach of trust. Under section 8-402(1) (c) of the Code,
such evidence is treated as "assurance" that an indorsement is genu-
ine and effective; such assurance, under section 8-401(1) (b), is a
condition of the issuer's duty to transfer. Under the Code failure
to obtain such evidence does not affect liability for wrongful regis-
tration: if in fact the indorsement is effective, liability for partici-
pation in breach of trust under section 8-404 depends on whether
there was a duty to inquire under section 8-403, and section 8-403
makes no reference to evidence of appointment or incumbency.
Thus the obtaining of the evidence is a condition of immunity
from liability for wrongful registration under the Uniform Act; un-
der the Code it is a practical precaution which the issuer may take
to protect itself if it so desires. There seems to be no need to con-
form the Code to the Uniform Act in this aspect. If the proposed
amendments to the Code are adopted, the specifications of the type
of evidence to be obtained will be substantially identical in both
statutes, but the Code will continue to give the issuer an option to
run the risk that indorsements are ineffective, free of any risk from
breach of trust.
Inquiry. Under the proposed amendments section 8-403 of the
Code will permit the issuer to "assume without inquiry" in substan-
tially the language of the Uniform Act. Section 8-402(4), like sec-
tion 4(b) of the Uniform Act, will free the issuer from any notice
from documents properly obtained as evidence of appointment or
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
incumbency. The duty to honor a written notice of an adverse claim
will be the same as in the Uniform Act, but will be stated in terms
of a "duty to inquire" rather than as an exception to the statutory
immunity from liability. And the Code, in section 8-402(4), will
spell out the conclusions, found only by implication in the Uniform
Act,7 (1) that the issuer who makes unnecessary inquiry is charged
with notice of what he should find, and (2) that inquiry beyond
that specified in the statute is a justification for delay in registration
only if reasonable or if the transfer turns out to be wrongful.
Adverse Claims. The Code states the procedure to be followed
when a notice of adverse claim is received, in terms of discharging
the duty of inquiry. The narrow liability-free path prescribed by the
Uniform Act is open under the Code, but the notice sent to the
adverse claimant must contain terms prescribed by section 8-403 (2)
explaining what the issuer proposes to do. The Code also permits
the duty of inquiry to be discharged "by any reasonable means,"
and expressly refers to the filing of an indemnity bond.72 The pro-
posed amendments do not affect these provisions of the Code, which
seem to be consistent with those of the Uniform Act but to add
flexibility.
Rights of Third Persons. The proposed amendments would ex-
tend section 8-818 of the Code, limiting the liability of agents and
bailees for conversion, to limit liability for participation in breach
of trust as well. This conforms to Section 7(a) of the Uniform Act,
except that the less onerous standard of "good faith" is substituted
for "actual knowledge.""' As to purchasers, the Code deals with
ownership rights as well as with liability for participation in breach
of trust, and the proposed amendment to section 8-304 would conform
the test of bona fide purchase to the "actual knowledge" standard
of section 7(a) of the Uniform Act and of Code section 3-304, deal-
ing with commercial paper.
Resulting Consistency. It is believed that the proposed amend-
ments are sufficient to produce consistency in practical effect be-
tween a state which enacts the Code and a state which enacts the
Uniform Act. Of course uniformity is limited to the narrow scope
of the Uniform Act, and there is some possibility that differences in
terminology may produce some unforeseen difference in meaning.
Moreover, there are three minor differences of substance: (1) un-
der the Code the issuer who relies solely on the signature guarantee
to show the incumbency of the fiduciary incurs no added responsi-
bility for breaches of trust;74 (2) the Code prescribes in more
71. See text at notes 52, 53 supra.
72. See note 55 supra.
73. Defined in section 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact"; cf. § 1-203; sco note 60
supra.
74. See note 37 supra.
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detail the contents of the notice to be sent to an adverse claimant;
(3) the Code standard for participation in breach of trust by an agent
or bailee is -good faith rather than "actual knowledge." But none
of these variations seems to have any great practical significance.
The question may well arise, however, whether both statutes
should be enacted in the same state. It may even happen that both
are pending before the same legislature at the same time. What
then? The writer's belief is that no practical harm would come of
enactment of both. A similar problem was faced when the Code
was enacted in Massachusetts, and it was decided not to repeal the
earlier Massachusetts act.75 But as an esthetic matter it would seem
desirable to provide for any conflict which might result. This couldbe done, for example, by adding a new subsection (3) to sec-
tion 8-404, "Liability and Non-Liability for Registration":
"(8) Nothing in this section imposes any liability on an issuer or transfer
agent for acting in a manner authorized by the Uniform Act for Simpli-
fication of Fiduciary Security Transfers."
VI. CONCLUSION
The objective of all this effort is a uniform nationwide system for
registering fiduciary transfers of securities. Where the fiduciary is
the registered owner, transfer would be made on his signature, sup-
ported only by a signature guarantee and any necessary tax waiver.
Where an executor, administrator or guardian seeks transfer of se-
curities registered in the name of his decedent or ward, a simple
court certificate dated within sixty days would be the only addi-
tional document. A successor trustee not appointed by a court would
have to supply some other appropriate evidence of incumbency.
Wills, trust instruments, court orders and affidavits would not ordi-
narily be supplied to the transfer agent.
There is some hope that such a system may be established under
present law for transfers whose only relevant contacts are with
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois and Massachusetts. Widespread en-
actment of the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers, or of a conforming version of the Uniform Commercial
Code, or of both, should make possible the extension of that system.
But perhaps more important than any change in the law is the con-
vincing of the transfer agents that simplified transfers are desirable
and safe. One clear-cut decision by the New York Court of Appeals,
to the effect that under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act a corporation
incurred liability for substantial damages because its transfer agent
refused to register a transfer until a copy of a will was supplied,
might have done more to simplify transfers than all the legislative
75. See note 9 supra; Massachusetts Annotations to Section 8-403(3), MASS. A..K.
LAws c. 106 (Supp. 1958).
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efforts to date. In the absence of such a decision, it is necessary that
legislative efforts be supplemented by unremitting efforts of all in-
terested parties to persuade transfer agents to abandon their de-
mands for excessive documentation.
This effort provides a nice illustration of the problems encountered
in obtaining uniform legislation, and particularly of the utility of
consultation with representatives of all possible interested groups.
It also shows that comprehensive codification need not freeze obso-
lete rules of law or prevent review and reform in the light of
changed conditions. There was some initial resistance to the pro-
posal to draft the Uniform Act, on the ground that it might impede
efforts to enact the Uniform Commercial Code. But it seems clear
as a matter of hindsight that the Conference decision to go forward
was sound: the result has been to improve the Code, and to allay
fears that the sponsors of the Code had lost sight of the goal of
flexibility in their pursuit of the goal of uniformity.
